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GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION
LOAN POLICY UNDER THE
RURAL ELECTRIFICATION ACT
By ROBERT T.

CONNERY*

Mr. Connery's topic is the controversial policy used by the
Rural Electrification Administration in making loans under the
Rural ElectrificationAct. The discussion presents the historicalproblems giving rise to the act and the solutions contained therein. The
author then traces the transformation of formerly rural areas into
urban areas which brought the rural cooperatives into direct conflict
with investor-owned utilities. This change resulted in a loan policy
designed to protect areas the cooperatives were already serving from
intrusion by the utilities. The utilities challenge the validity of this
policy as being outside the purpose of the act. The dilemma is
exemplified by examination of two jurisdictions wherein the state
courts reach conflicting results in situations where the utility was
competing with the cooperative for the same territory.
INTRODUCTION

F EW Americans are not familiar with the continuing feud between
the investor-owned electric power companies and the rural electric cooperatives. Full-page ads in almost every major publication in
the country solicit the public's support for either the power companies or the cooperatives. Headlines above the picture of a rural
couple in an investor-owned companies' ad read, "These People
Don't Want To Be Used By The REA Or Anyone Else."' The text
of the ad queries "whether there is a planned attempt to use rural
electric cooperatives for developing a nationwide Government power
system,"' which would destroy the power companies. Another couple
appear in a cooperative ad which declares "These people don't want
to be 'taken' by the power company - or any other monopoly.' " A
cooperative spokesman testifying at a Congressional hearing says
that "these companies have been conducting a well-planned and carefully coordinated program to destroy the electric cooperatives in
Louisiana .... [Their] goal is the ultimate destruction of any and
all competition .... .Concerning
the nation's power companies,
*B.A., magna cum laude, Yale University, 1962; LL.B., Harvard University, 1966.
1 Hearings on Agricultural Appropriations for 1965 before the Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 419 (1964) (hereinafter cited as 1965 Senate Hearingson Agricultural Appropriations).
2 Ibid.
3 National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, RURAL ELECTRIC FACT BOOK, p. 72
(Wise ed. 1965).
4 Statement of Theo. Cangelosi on behalf of the Association of Louisiana Electric Cooperatives, 1965 Senate Hearings on Agricultural Appropriations, supra note 1, at
386-87.
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the head of the cooperatives' national lobby has said: "Their object
is to take over the government. They are public enemy No. 1 - more
dangerous than Communists because Communists are no longer a
threat, but dictatorship is a threat.' The mutual paranoia apparent
in these pronouncements pervades and distorts the debate between
the power companies and the cooperatives over the main issues which
divide them, namely, (1) the policy followed by the federal Rural
Electrification Administration (REA) in making loans at a subsidized
interest rate and (2) whether or not the cooperatives should be subjected to state regulation in states where they are presently exempt.
I.

HISTORY

A. Background
As early as 1915 engineers had discovered how to transmit electricity over distances of up to one hundred miles and most of the nation's farmers, even then, lived within one hundred miles of central
station electric generators.6 Yet twenty years later, at a time when
ninety per cent of the farms in Germany, France, and Japan were
electrified,7 only eleven per cent of America's farms were receiving
central station electric service.8 The cost of distributing electricity
to areas with only a few consumers per mile was prohibitive for commercial power companies. Farmers consumed very little electricity
and simply could not afford rates adequate to attract the capital necessary for the construction of lines to their farms. In addition, the
farmer was among the first and hardest hit by the Great Depression.
The prospects that the "over-producing" farmer of the Twenties and
Thirties would be able to afford the equipment which would make
him a consumer of electricity and able to pay electric rates which
would provide an after-tax rate of return sufficient to attract capital
were dim indeed. No more than fifty per cent of the few non-profit
rural electric cooperatives which had been formed were able to succeed.' As a business proposition rural electrification was a bad risk,
if not an impossibility.
But while costs and good business judgment weighed against
rural electrification, many benefits such as lighting, plumbing, and
communication were to be derived from it. These and countless other
5 Quoted from an October, 1963, Portland Oregonian by Kay, There's No Stopping
REA - Or Is There?, Fortune, Feb., 1963, p. 170.
6 Rural Electrification Administration, Rural Lines • USA, The Story of Cooperative
Rural Electrification, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Misc. Publication No. 811, p. 3
(Rev. ed. 1966).
780 CONG. REc. 5279-80 (1936).
8 Rural Lines • USA, supra note 6, at 3.
9 Rural Electrification Administration, Rural Lines • USA, The Story of the Rural
Electrification Administration's First Twenty-Five Years * 1935-1960, U.S. Dep't of
Agriculture, Misc. Publication No. 811, p. 9 (1960).
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benefits provided the social and economic justification for rural electrification. But even after political support for the idea had been
mustered, the question of how to accomplish the task remained.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt answered this question by creating the Rural Electrification Administration by executive order and
giving its administrator one hundred million dollars to "initiate, formulate, administer, and supervise a program of approved projects
with respect to the generation, transmission, and distribution of electric energy in rural areas .
'10 An electric utilities industry committee proposed spending the one hundred million dollars, plus a
13,685,000 dollar utilities industry contribution, on line construction
and further recommended that other federal agencies provide 124
million dollars in credit to rural people for wiring and electric appliances. 1 The offer was rejected and the one hundred million dollars
was thrown open "for loans for rural line construction from public
and private agencies."12 Other disputes between the power companies and the federal government, notably TVA, were simmering
and before long cooperation with the power companies completely
terminated.
B. The Rural ElectrificationAct of 1936
The statutory tool for performing the task of rural electrification was provided by the Rural Electrification Act of 1936.13 Administrative method and purpose were well-defined. Under Section 4 of
the act, which remains essentially unchanged, the Administrator was
authorized
to make loans to persons, corporations, States, Territories and subdivisions and agencies thereof, municipalities, peoples' utility districts and cooperative, non-profit, or limited-dividend associations
...for the purpose of financing the construction and operation of
generating plants, electric transmission and distribution lines or systems for the furnishing of electric energy to persons in rural areas
who are not receiving central station service."1
"Rural areas" were those "not included within the boundaries of any
city, village, or borough having a population in excess of fifteen
hundred inhabitants."' 5 Loan funds were also made available to assist persons in rural areas in obtaining and installing electrical equipment and appliances."6 The act thus encompassed financing the gen10

Person, The Rural Electrification Administration In Perspective, reprinted from 24
AGRICULTURAL HISTORY 70 (1950).

'Id.

at 4-5.

' 2 1d. at 5.
1349 Stat. 1363 (1936), as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1964).
14 49 Stat. 1365 (1936), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 904 (1964). The words "for rural
electrification" were added after "to make loans" in 63 Stat. 948 '(1949).
1549 Stat. 1367 (1936), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 913 (1964).
1649 Stat. 1365 (1936), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 905 (1964).
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eration, transmission, distribution, and consumption of electricity by
persons in rural areas not receiving central station power. The loans
were to be made at the same interest rate which the government paid
for long-term securities and for periods of up to twenty-five years."
A preference was given to cooperatives and other eligible borrowers
over persons and corporations. 8
During the floor debate in both the House and Senate, apprehension was expressed that the funds might be used to sponsor competition with power companies for customers already receiving central
station power or used in other ways to displace the existing electric
utility industry. But in the words of the bill's House sponsor, Representative Rayburn, "we are not... intending to go out and compete
with anybody. By this bill we hope to bring electrification to people
who do not now have it.''19 Senator Norris, the Senate sponsor,
agreed with Senator McNary's interpretation that the act did not
provide funds to build a duplicate plant in an area being adequately
served.2 The REA's Administrator stated that generation and transmission (G&T) loans would be made only if it were
shown conclusively: (1) that energy is not available from any existing source; (2) that the proposed generating plant can produce energy at a lower cost than it could be obtained from any other source;
(3) that the output of such plant will be used mainly for supplying
21
energy for use in rural areas.

The economic problem in 1936 was distribution, not generation
or transmission. As the Administrator told the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Coimnerce, "In 99 instances out of 100 they
[the cooperatives] are going to buy current from existing plants. "22
C. The Cooperatives
While the Rural Electrification Act provided clear loan authority
for financing all phases of electrification for those in rural areas not
receiving central station power, a viable business organization had to
be found to accomplish the job and repay the loans and interest. As
has been noted, relations between the electric utility industry and the
government had broken down.2 ' The REA decided that the best device for rural electrification would be the non-profit cooperative asStat. 1365 (1936), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 904 (1964).
18 Ibid.
1749

19 80 CONG. REC. 5283 (1936).
'080 CONG. REC. 2751 (1936).
2180 CONG. REc. 2823 (1936).
2

Garwood and Tuthill, The Rural Electrification Administration, An Evaluation,

23 See text following note 11 supra. The power companies did continue to extend serv-

ice to rural areas. Today they serve 43 percent of the nation's farms, 1965 Senate
Hearings on Agricultural Appropriations,supra note 1, at 263.
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sociation. A Model Electric Cooperative Corporation Act was drafted
giving the cooperatives power to organize and build and exempting
them from state public utility commission jurisdiction.24 The model
act had been passed by twenty-three states in 1940.25
Demand for electricity on the farm was high, but the legal,
technical, and management know-how required to make a successful
system was usually lacking. In an attempt to meet this problem the
REA, with enthusiastic farmer support, helped organize, design systems, and train personnel for the fledgling cooperatives. Nevertheless, progress was frustratingly slow. As soon as the program began
to operate, World War II intervened. REA appropriations were reduced during this period" while farm energy was devoted to furthering the war effort.
With the end of the war in sight, Congress turned a sympathetic
ear to the REA. In 1944 it amended the Rural Electrification Act to
provide a fixed statutory interest rate of two per cent.2" The difference between two per cent and the cost of money to the U.S. Treasury,
in 1966 four to four and one-half per cent,28 was to provide a small
but important subsidy. Further, the repayment period was extended
from twenty-five to thirty-five years.2" Although the original act envisioned the completion of rural electrification in ten years, the new
amendments gave the REA an unlimited period of time to finish the
job." REA appropriations jumped to 500 million dollars in 1950, as
the program moved into high gear. 1
With only a few setbacks during the Korean War years, the
program has remained in high gear, its 1964 authorization being 425
million dollars.12 By 1965, ninety-eight and two tenths per cent of the
nation's farms had central station electricity. 3 The gain in farms
electrified each year since 1961 has been only a few tenths of a per
24

Rural Lines * USA (1960), supra note 9, at 10.

25 Ibid.
26 Person, The Rural ElectrificationAdministration In Perspective, supra note 10, at 10.
27 58 Stat. 739, 740 (1944), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 904 (1964).
28 U.S. TREAs. BULL. (Dec., 1965-March, 1966), average yield on long-term treasury
bonds. Ann. Report of the Secretary of the Treasury at 585 (July 1, 1963-June 30,
1964).
29 58 Stat. 739 (1944), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 904 (1964).
30 ibid.
21 National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, Rural Electric Financing Study Re4
port, p. 5 (1965).
32 Kuhn, Loeb & Co., A Survey of Methods for Financing Rural Electric Cooperatives
In the Capital Market, published in Rural Electric Financing Study Report, 133, at
140 (July, 1965) [hereinafter cited as Kuhn, Loeb Report).
33 1965 Report of the Administrator of the Rural Electrification Administration, Table
4 (mimeograph edition).
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cent.34 Five out of every six new customers added by REA borrowers
have been non-farm rural customers."
D. The NRECA
In 1942 the cooperatives formed a national "service organization," a lobby, the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association
(NRECA) to preserve the program and organize the political support necessary for its success. By tightly integrating local, state, and
regional electric cooperative organizations, the NRECA gave the cooperatives unity and developed their policies and purpose. The Administrator, of necessity, works with and through the NTRECA. Far
more than the REA itself, the NRECA has been responsible for the
dynamism and expansion of electric cooperative activitiy into new
areas, such as industrial recruiting for rural areas and competition
for new urban areas. REA loans have been employed in this expanded activity and these uses are the objects of bitter attack from
concerns affected by the competition of the cooperatives.
II.

THE UNFORESEEN CONFLICT

By 1965 the task of extending central station electric power to
those in rural areas not receiving it was essentially complete. Less
than one-half of current REA loans to cooperatives, totalling 300 to
350 million dollars a year, go for that purpose.36 Most of the present
loans are for construction of cooperative G&T facilities and are made
under a policy promulgated in 1961 by the current Administrator,
Norman M. Clapp. This new policy requires only that the loan be
"necessary to protect the security and effectiveness of REA-financed
systems. ' 37 The statutory validity and economic wisdom of this administrative policy is being challenged by the power companies.
At the heart of the problem is the lucrative new market for electricity being created by the growth of cities. Each year hundreds of
square miles of formerly rural areas are annexed by existing municipalities or incorporated into separate new cities. Under a literal reading of the statute these areas, no longer being rural, are ineligible
for REA loans. It can be said with some assurance that the purpose
of the Rural Electrification Act was not to make loans at a subsidized interest rate for extending electricity to burgeoning, prosperous
suburbs which power companies will serve as quickly as they are built.
In many areas, however, the suburbs are sprawling into sparsely
settled rural areas where the cooperatives have built lines to serve,
34 1961-1965 Reports of the Administrator of the REA, Table 4.
35Kuhn, Loeb Report, supra note 32, at 147.

36 1961-1965 Reports of the Administrator of the REA, Table 2.
37 REA Bulletin 20-6, May 31, 1961, published in 1965 Senate Hearingson Agricultural
Appropriations,supra note 1, at 145.
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typically, three to four consumers per mile. 8 Having extended service to the few in the area when it was rural and unprofitable for the
power companies to do so, the cooperatives claim that the area is
their "territory," not by virtue of any governmental franchise or
public utility commission certificate of public convenience and necessity to serve a defined area, but solely by reason of original service to
what was once a rural area. The right to maintain their "territorial
integrity" against the incursions of the power companies and thus to
serve the expanding urban market has become the primary policy objective of the cooperatives, the NRECA, and the REA." Some cooperatives regard any extension of power company service into these
ill-defined territories as clear evidence of an intent to destroy the cooperatives" and claim that if they are not allowed to serve the prof itable new loads in their territories, they will eventually perish. The
new criterion for G&T loans, "protecting the security and effectiveness of REA-financed systems," is aimed specifically at protecting the
"territorial integrity" of the cooperatives.
On the other hand, the power companies, being almost universally under state regulation and usually having a franchise from the
city which has recently annexed the cooperative's "territory" or a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the state regulatory
body to service the area, regard the area as theirs. Indeed, in most
states the state regulatory commission has statutory power to compel
the companies to extend service on request so long as the extended
service will produce a fair return on the investment required to make
the extension.41 Despite the cooperative's non-profit form of operation, exemption from federal and usually state and local taxes, subsidized capital, preference in purchasing power provided by federal
installations, and absorption of many administrative costs by the
REA, electric power distribution in rural areas still costs more than
it does in urban areas. Rates charged reflect this cost difference on the average, consumers on REA-financed systems pay nineteen
per cent more for their electricity than do consumers in adjacent
towns and cities.' Power company service is thus often preferred by
consumers on the expanding edge of the city and even existing cooperative customers sometimes succumb to the cheaper rates and request or even compel company service.
38 1965 Report, supra note 33.
39 Each report of the REA Administrator for the past few years contains a section de-

voted to progress in "territorial integrity," and REA Bulletin 3-3, Feb. 12, 1962,
published in the 1965 Senate Hearings on AgriculturalAppropriations, supra note 1,
at 141, makes it official policy. See also, RURAL ELECTRIC FACT BOOK, supra note
3, at 114.
40 See text accompanying note 4 supra.
41 See e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45:122 (1950).
411965

Report of the Administrator, supra note 33, at 1.
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The REA has declared that "parity of rural service with city
service" is an important element of its broad objective of "social and
economic parity of country with city."4 One way of achieving parity
in cost of service, and the one which the cooperatives and the REA
seem to be pursuing under the policy of "territorial integrity," is to
draw territorial lines around historically rural areas, include the city
as it grows into the territory, and equalize rates between the city and
the rural sectors of the territory." Under the public utility laws of
most states, however, extracting a higher profit or "margin" above
fully-allocated cost from one group of customers in order to defray
the cost of service to another group of the same class of customers
may constitute an illegal discrimination.45 If a non-profit cooperative
were to charge the same rate to its rural and city residential customers
when the cost of serving its city customers was twenty per cent less
than the cost of serving its rural customers, an illegal discrimination
might well be found. But in twenty-one of the forty-six states in
which they operate, the cooperatives are not subject to state public
utility commission regulation and in four other states are not subject
to rate regulation. 6 Thus, in most of the states in which cooperatives
operate they are not prevented by state commissions from discriminating between customers in the same category of service. In those states,
if the cooperatives can exclude power company service from their
territories, legally they should be able to establish parity of rates between rural and adjacent urban areas within cooperative territory.
Under the cooperatives' and the REA's policy of "territorial integrity," the consumers in newly urbanized rural areas which are less
expensive to serve might have to bear the cost of achieving parity between rural and urban consumers. The act contains no language to
indicate that rural customers were not to pay the full cost of their
electricity. Loans under the act are and have been available to power
companies and there is no requirement that their rates reflect anything less than fully-allocated cost. Since a power company serving
a city might obtain a loan from the REA to serve the adjacent countryside and might be required under state law to reflect the greater
cost of rural distribution in its electric rates to rural consumers, it
would seem that some disparity between rural and city rates was
clearly contemplated by the act. Thus, achieving "parity" in electric
431d. at 1-2.
44Any increment over marginal cost from urban fringe consumers would, of course,

help reduce the rates of the cooperative's other members. But for equalization to take
place it seems that urban fringe consumers would have to pay well above their share
of fully-allocated cost.
45 Hale and Hale, Competition or Control V: Production and Distribution of Electric
Energy, 110 U. PA. L. KEV. 57, 70 (1961) (citing cases).
46U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, STATE COMMISSION JURSDICTION, RURAL ELECTRIC
COOPERATIVES

(1964).
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rates through "territorial integrity" does not seem within the purpose
of the REA's enabling act.
III.

TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY: AN ECONOMIC IMPERATIVE?

The cooperatives, the NRECA, and the REA do not regard the
fight for "territorial integrity" as determining only whether rural
electric rates in the future will be on a par with urban rates. They
view it as their Armageddon - a final fight for survival against the
power companies - and claim that the cooperatives will fail if their
territories are not secured. Keeping the cooperatives, which furnish
electricity to fifty-four per cent of the nation's farms, afloat and capable of serving rural areas which would not otherwise receive central
station power would clearly seem to be a corollary of the Administrator's power under the act to make loans establishing them. The validity of the exercise of this correlative power hinges on whether or
not the cooperatives face an economic crisis without such maintenance.
Cooperatives are thriving in both states which do, as well as in
those which do not, provide them with territorial protection. Each
year the number of consumers per mile is larger 7 and the amount of
electricity used by each consumer increases.48 As a result, the revenue
per mile of line has grown."' The cost of wholesale power has also
decreased."0 Out of 1,104 electric borrowers, about 1000 of which
are cooperatives, only five are delinquent in repayment." Far from
being driven out of the market, cooperatives have been steadily increasing their share of the nation's total energy sales.5 2 Their growth
rate in kilowatt hour (KWH) sales and in revenues has been greater
than that of the investor-owned utilities in recent years.5 3
The cooperatives began with almost no equity. Aside from a
nominal membership fee from each consumer, almost all the cooperatives' capital was debt. As of December, 1964, however, 976 REA
borrowers had amassed a net worth, largely in the form of general
funds, of over one billion dollars. 4 The typical cooperative's net
55
worth was twenty-seven and nine tenths per cent of its total assets
of which only a small fraction comes from membership fees. The
great bulk of net worth has come from "net margins," revenues above
annual operating costs and debt retirement, which are credited to the
47 1965 Report, supra note 33, at 21.
48
4

Id., Table 6.

50

Id. at 7.

9Id. at 22.

51 Id., Table 8.
52 Kuhn, Loeb Report, supra note 32, at 148.
5

3 Id. at 149.
54 1965 Report, supra note 33, Table 10.
55
Id. at 4.
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members' patronage capital account." Thus out of the equivalent of
retained earnings the cooperatives have built, on the average, the
equivalent of an equity of twenty-seven and nine tenths per cent of
total assets. " This commercial success of the rural market appears
inconsistent with the cooperatives' demand that integration of the
urban and rural market is necessary for their survival .
Survival, indeed, is not the real issue. The real question seems
to be whether the capital which the cooperatives have accumulated
along with that which Congress is willing to provide will be sufficient to supply the projected capital growth which the cooperatives
believe necessary to serve their territories." The capital requirements
of the electric utility industry are growing at an accelerated pace; consumption has been doubling approximately every ten years6" causing
a costly "heavying up" of lines, transformers, and all other utility
components. The NRECA estimates that the capital requirements of
the rural electrification program will reach 675 million dollars a year
by 198061 and that Congress will be unwilling to supply more than
the current 300 to 350 million dollars per year at the low two per
cent interest rate.6" The net worth of the cooperatives has grown by
about ninety million dollars a year over the last five years;63 some of
that total might be used to meet capital requirements. Despite this
fact, some 235 to 325 million dollars annually will have to be borrowed in the private capital market by 1980 if the NRECA's estimates are correct. These estimates seem to be based on the assumption that the cooperatives have a right to and will be serving the urban market, with its much heavier capital needs, which spreads into
the territories they claim.
Although at present the cooperatives are able to meet their operating costs, interest, and principal payments and also accumulate
substantial amounts of capital, it must be kept in mind that their cost
of capital is two per cent. It is doubtful that they would be able to
56 Ibid.
57 There has been some criticism of the cooperatives for investing their retained "net
margins" in government bonds, savings and loan associations, and other forms of
investment which bear 4 to 41/2% interest, while borrowing money from the REA
for expansion at 2% interest.
58
Views of Clyde T. Ellis, General Manager of the NRECA, 38 CONG. DIG. 123 (1959).
59 It should be noted that the question of whether or not the need for supplemental
capital would disappear if the cooperatives continued to restrict themselves to rural
areas only, has not been examined.
60 1965 Report, supra note 33, Table 8.
61 Rural Electric Financing Study Report, supra note 31, at 44.
62 Letter from Charles A. Robinson, Jr., Staff Engineer and Staff Counsel, NRECA, to
the authnr Feb 28, 196'; "The Congress appears willing to make available only
approximately $300 to $350 million per year of two per cent, 35-year loan authorizations. Beyond that, it appears that supplemental financing will be required."
631965 Report, supra note 33, Table 10.
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attract capital in the open market without paying at least four to five
per cent interest. With two per cent capital, the interest coverage
- revenue available for payment of interest after payment of all operating charges - of the composite group of cooperatives was 2.97
times the interest payment required or 2.97x.6" At a four per cent interest rate the cooperatives' interest coverage would be 1.48x; at five
per cent, 1.18x. 6' The only source which could provide funds in the
required quantity would be the institutional investors, such as mutual
funds, trusts, or insurance companies. They generally require a mini7
6
66
mum interest coverage of 2.Ox, often due to state investment laws.

In addition, the issuer of bonds must generally be subject to the jurisdiction of a state or federal regulatory agency if it is to be treated as
a public utility for the purpose of financing.68 At present the cooperatives are subject to state commission jurisdiction to the same extent
as the investor-owned utilities in only fifteen states."" In other states
the cooperatives would have to qualify their bonds as general corporate obligations. Investors would probably also require that the
REA's first mortgage with its "after acquired" property clause be
subordinated and that members of the cooperative not withdraw their
patronage capital before the loan is repaid. Further, according to a
recent investment study, the fact that investor-owned utilities might
serve rural areas that become increasingly urbanized is a risk to the
investor." The lack of a clearly defined service area is a distinct limitation to private financing of the cooperatives. 1 Territorial protection and state regulatory jurisdiction are apparently necessary for the
cooperatives to acquire private financing.
Thus it seems clear that at the present time the cooperatives are
not prosperous enough to secure their future capital requirement
through private financing." In fact, to attract private financing, their
areas will have to become nearly as dense and lucrative as the areas
investor-owned utilities serve if, as is often asserted,73 utility commissions set rates just high enough to attract investment. Since cooperaKuhn, Loeb Report, supra note 32, at 166.
ld. at 167.
6
Id. at 153.
7
6 1d. at 158-59.
68 Id. at 159.
69
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, op. cit. supra note 46, at 2.
70
Kuhn, Loeb Report, supra note 32, at 161.
64
65

71

Ibid.

72 The NRECA has several alternative plans under study for securing private financing

for the cooperatives as a group, the most promising of which is the creation of a
federal bank which, with initial federal capital, could borrow in the private capital
market. The NRECA supports the federal bank idea. Part of the plan is for the cooperatives to buy the federal government's initial capital eventually and operate independently thereafter.
73 Hale and Hale, supra note 45, at 69-70.
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tives pay no federal income tax and are exempt from many state and
local taxes, they could more easily afford to pay the going rate to attract investment at a lower level of revenue than could the power
companies.
One objective of the policy of "territorial integrity" appears to
be assisting cooperatives in acquiring private financing, thus eventually establishing them as independent utilities which can obtain their
capital requirements in the private market and prosper without government assistance. Since one purpose of the Rural Electrification
Act seems to be permanent provision of central station service to those
in rural areas, territorial integrity, which contemplates that end, may
fall within that purpose.
By the foregoing rather tortuous justification, the objective of
"territorial integrity" can be fit within the statute's possible purposes.
But the definitive powers of the Administrator under the act almost
belie a construction that they could be used to protect "territorial integrity." His power to finance G&T facilities through loans cannot,
of itself, protect a cooperative's territory. If the cost of electricity
produced by a new generating and transmitting system is greater than
the cost of purchasing from the power companies at wholesale, the
result of the G&T loan may be to weaken the cooperative's competitive and financial position. Cooperatives presently buy much of their
power from the same power companies which might spread into their
territories. The loss of a co-op's wholesale power business would
cause great loss to the power companies by idling generating and
transmitting capacity built to supply cooperative distribution systems.
Cooperatives can threaten power companies with that loss only if an
alternative source of power is available. The REA makes that alternative source available through its G&T loans. In a recent case74 the
cooperatives - with the Administrator's support - insisted that a
territorial protection clause be inserted in their wholesale power contracts, threatening to build their own G&T facilities if the power companies would not comply, even though the cost of supplying their own
electricity would be greater than buying it from the power companies.
Thus under the new criterion, which grants G&T loans to protect the
security and effectiveness of REA-financed systems, the cooperatives
and the REA are seeking the power to displace an existing facility
adequately serving an area - a power which congressional sponsors
agreed was not contained in the Rural Electrification Act - in order
to protect "territorial integrity."
Practical considerations cast further doubts upon the advantages
74 Rural Electrification Administration v. Central La. Elec. Co., 354 F.2d 859 (5th
Cir. 1966). See textual discussion at note 104 infra.
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of exercising the G&T loan power to preserve existing territories. In
the example posed in the last paragraph, higher rates may result to
customers of the cooperatives and the power company, which may be
allowed to write off its losses and charge them to its customers. Further, the G&T loan may fail to protect the co-op's territory; for
while a power company may be deterred by the threat of losing
wholesale power sales before the loan is made, once it is made, competition should be stimulated. In addition, the cooperative formed
to receive the protective G&T loan, usually an association of distribution cooperatives, is generally weaker financially than the distribution
cooperatives. Its probable interest coverage at two per cent interest
is 1.86x7" and it requires far more capital. Creation of weaker G&T
cooperatives requiring more capital seems to defeat the Administrator's avowed objective in protecting the cooperatives' territories by
prolonging the period of REA support necessary to enable the cooperatives to acquire their independence. In view of the dubious effectiveness and possibly paradoxical results, the wisdom of making
G&T loans to protect "territorial integrity" seems as doubtful as the
statutory authority to make loans for such a purpose.
IV.

TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS

A more forceful argument against the legitimacy of the Administrator's use of G&T loans to force power companies to agree
to territorial protection clauses is that such agreements are illegal
under the antitrust laws. In Montana-Dakota Utilities v. Williams
Elec. Cooperative," a cooperative and a power company had entered
into a contract containing a territorial agreement delineating the
area to be served by each party. The contract was meant to resolve a
dispute over which party had the right to serve consumers on a city's
expanding edge.7 The Court of Appeals held that the territorial
agreement was "absolutely void, untempered by any application of
the 'rule of reason.' "" The decision was based on the principle that
"parties engaging in performing a duty or rendering a service which
is public in nature . . . cannot disable themselves by contract from
performing the public duties which they have undertaken. ' 7 If the
Public Service Commission had approved the contract, the agreement
75

Kuhn, Loeb Report, supra note 32, at 153.

76 263 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1959).
77 Under North Dakota's Public Service Commission's regulations the company could

have been compelled to extend service if the extension would produce a 6% return
which the cooperative conceded it would. See also text at note 41 supra.
Montana-Dakota Utils. v. Williams Elec. Coop., 263 F.2d 431, 434 (8th Cir. 1959).
79
1d. at 435. (Court quoting from Gibbs v. Baltimore Gas Co., 130 U.S. 396 (1889)).
78
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would probably have been saved from the Sherman Act violation."
More recent cases are split on the issue of the legality of territorial divisions between electric utilities under the antitrust laws.
Due to extensive state and federal regulations, many states grant
utilities broad exemptions from the antitrust laws. 1 But cooperatives
in many states are not subject to regulation.' Even in states where
cooperatives are not subject to regulation, contracts between power
companies and cooperatives defining service areas have been upheld
though not approved by the state regulatory commission.83 Perhaps
a better method of applying the antitrust laws would be to determine
whether the evils of a particular anti-competitive practice are prevented by direct or indirect state regulation, rather than refusing, as
the court in Williams Elec. Cooperative did, to examine the amount
or effect of the restraint.
A special problem is presented where a power company which
is fully subject to rate and other regulation enters into a territorial
division agreement with a cooperative which is exempt from regulation. The cooperative, being free from competition, then becomes an
unregulated monopoly, a result which might be repugnant to the antitrust laws. In response to such arguments the cooperatives have said
that they are self-regulating and therefore presumably need neither
competition nor regulation to ensure that their conduct will be in
the public interest. By self-regulation, the cooperatives mean that
the interests of their consumers are identical with those of the cooperative since it is consumer-owned and non-profit.
The rationale of self-regulation is not, however, persuasive in all
cases. It assumes that the consumers of the cooperative are the only
group meant to be protected by regulation. The issue before most
regulatory commissions in authorizing construction is what is in the
public interest - the interest of the general public and not of a particular class. Quite possibly an action a cooperative deems in its own
80 "There is an almost universal trend among public service commissions to approve

contracts for division of territory if the interest of the public is thereby served."
Note, Division-of-Territories Agreement Between Electric Power Company and
Power Cooperative Void as Restraint of Trade Regardless of Reasonableness, 36 U.
DET. L.J. 626, 630 (1959). See also cases collected in note 25 supra at 630; Annot.,
70 A.L.R.2d 1326, 1331 (1959). In particular see Ohio-Midland Light & Power Co.
v. Columbus & Southern Ohio Elec. Co., 123 N.E.2d 675, 678 (Ohio 1954), and
People's Gas Sys. Inc. v. City Gas Co., 167 So. 2d 577, 584 (Fla. App. 1964).
81 Hale and Hale, supra note 45, at 75-76 (cases collected). See e.g., Idaho Power &
Light Co. v. Blomquist, 26 Idaho 222, 248-49, 141 Pac. 1083, 1091 (1914). Under
state regulation, the court said, "there is no longer any justification whatever for
competition or the duplication of utility plants under the pretense of preventing
monopoly."
823T.S. DEP'T oF AGRICULTIURE, op. cit. supra note 46. The cooperatives are exempt

from commission in 21 states, and subject to varying degrees of limited commission
in 11 states.
83 Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n v. Colo. Cent. Power Co., 135 Colo. 42, 307 P.2d
1101, 18 P.U.R.3d 41 (1957).
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best interest, such as building a G&T facility, would have an adverse
impact on its present wholesale supplier and the supplier's other consumers. The adverse consequences of its action on such a supplier
may outweigh the benefits to its own consumers. In such a situation
the interest of the public as a whole would be contrary to the cooperative's self-interest, an opposition which state regulation was
obviously designed to resolve. The cooperatives have maintained
their exemption from general regulation in thirty-three states84 on
grounds of self-regulation and presently are bitterly contesting the
assertion of Federal Power Commission jurisdiction over them on
the same ground."
But while consumer-ownership and non-profit operation may be
insufficient grounds for exemption from regulation, at least in the
case of a territorial division between a regulated power company and
an unregulated cooperative, they seem to remove most of the evils
which the antitrust laws were designed to forbid. No danger exists
that monoply profits will be exacted from cooperative customers since
any margins earned by the cooperative are either returned to members or credited to their patronage capital account, which usually can
only be distributed on a majority vote of consumer-members. Since
the state regulatory commission is responsible for allocation of resources in the rest of the state and the cooperative's consumer-owners
presumably act in their own self-interest, there would seem little
room for the evils of anti-competition. It seems possible, however,
that consumers on the fringe of an urban territory could be deprived
by a territorial agreement of the lower rates which competition with
the power company would provide. Being, perhaps, in a minority
within the cooperative such consumers could be subjected to a discriminatory rate and effectively deprived of their portion of margins
above cost by a rural majority. " The rural majority may, indeed, believe in using discriminatory rates to equalize the cost of electricity
between rural and urban areas, and the cooperative may need to use
its accumulated margins for capital expansion. Even though the
urban fringe consumer owns his proportionate share of accumulated
margins, he could not withdraw them. The possible existence of
such a case serves as a strong argument for either the extension of
commission jurisdiction to cooperatives or the preservation of the
defense of invalidity under the antitrust laws when territorial agreements are used to discriminate against and extract monopoly profits
84

U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, op. cit. supra note 46.

85 National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, RURAL ELECTRIC FACT BOOK, p. 127

(Wise ed. 1965).
86 An equitable action against the cooperative for discriminating against one group of

its owners might be possible.
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from a group of consumers. But the possibility of such a case does
not seem to demand the "absolutely void, untempered by any application of the 'rule of reason'" approach of the Williams Elec. Cooperative case.
Considering the dubious validity under antitrust laws of territorial division agreements, the cooperatives' insistence on their inclusion in wholesale power contracts seems unreasonable. From
the point of view of the Administrator and the cooperatives, however, a deadly duel for survival is taking place. Without "territorial
integrity" the power companies will be free to "pirate" customers
from the areas to which the cooperatives have laid claim by first service. And since many of the statutes under which the cooperatives are
incorporated confine them to rural areas, they are not free to "pirate"
power company customers - a most inequitable situation. The Administrator unfortunately has only one cumbersome blunderbuss in
his administrative arsenal with which to defend his flock - the G&T
loan. Such is the dilemma of the REA's G&T loan policy.
V. THE DILEMMA
Two recent controversial cases 87 contesting the legality of REA
G&T loans, currently on appeal to the United States Supreme Court,
provide examples of the myriad economic and legal issues which
cluster around the dispute. The particular cases were chosen because
they arise in states whose theories of electric public utility regulation
are at almost opposite ends of the spectrum which runs from nonregulation to total regulation of cooperatives.
In Colorado, the cooperatives are subject to Public Utility Commission (P.U.C.) jurisdiction to the same extent as are investorowned utilities.88 The Commission's regulation is extensive, covering
rates, " issuance of securities," the systems of accounts,9 ' and including the power to change a utility's "rules, regulations, practices,
equipment, appliances, facilities or services ...or methods of manufacture, distribution, transmission, storage or supply" if it finds them
"unjust, unreasonable, unsafe, improper, inadequate, or insufficient."92 Before constructing any new facility, plant, or system the
utility must obtain from the commission a certificate of public con87Rural Electrification Administration v. Central La. Elec. Co., 354 F.2d 859 (5th
Cir. 1966); Western Colo. Power Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n., 411 P.2d 785
(Colo. 1966).
88
COLO. REV. STAT. § 115-1-3(2) (1963).
"COLO.RE.
90
91

STAT. §

115-3-3 to.11

(1963.

CoLo. REV. STAT. § 115-1-4 (1963).

COLO.REV. STAT. § 115-4-11 (1963).
2
9 COLO. REV. STAT. § 115-4-1 (1963).
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venience and necessity. 3 A finding upon its own motion or on complaint that "there is or will be a duplication of services" gives the
Commission the power to issue the certificate "assigning specific
territories" to eliminate the duplication and otherwise prescribe conditions of operation for the future. Transfers of certificates are
also regulated. 5 A scheme of regulation which so pervasively controls every aspect of the utility's activities is described as operating
under the doctrine of "regulated monopoly."
A very different regime of regulation is applied in Louisiana.
The cooperatives are exempt from the Louisiana Public Service Commission's jurisdiction "" and from the state's securities laws on indebtedness issued to the United States or an instrumentality thereof." In
short, the theory of "cooperative self-regulation" is accepted fully.
Moreover, electric utilities which are subject to Commission regulation need not obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity
to construct facilities and expand their systems. The only instance in
which a certificate must be obtained is when one electric public utility
extends service "to customers already receiving electric service from
another electric public utility."98 Rates, " service,' 00 and to some extent the issues of securities,10' are regulated.
In many recent suits' by cooperatives seeking to restrain power
companies from extending service into areas which they claim sometimes on the basis of a single line to one customer - the Louisiana courts have consistently held that the Public Service Commission
has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute, despite the fact that it has
no jurisdiction over the cooperatives. Moreover, the Louisiana Court
of Appeals has said of the cooperatives' territorial claim that "the
effect of this argument would be to create a monopoly in the electric
utility industry through allocation of areas. The laws of Louisiana
specifically preclude such exclusive franchises."'0 3 Competition for
new customers, even in areas served by other electric utilities, is ob93

COLO. REV. STAT. § 115-5-1(1)

(1963).

94 COLO. REV. STAT. § 115-5-1(2)

(1963).

9

5COLo. REV. STAT.

§

115-5-5 '(1963).

96LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:326 (1950).
97
98
99

LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
LA.REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 12:327
§ 45:123

(1950).
(1950).

LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 45:1163 (1950).
100 Ibid.
101 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1168 to 45:1175 (1950).
102 South Louisiana Elec. Coop. v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 161 So. 2d 413 (La.
App. 1964) ; South Louisiana Elec. Coop. v. Central Louisiana Elec. Co., 140 So. 2d
687-88 (La. App. 1962). The power companies have likewise been remitted to the
P.S.C. in such disputes, see e.g., Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Dixie Elec. Membership
Corp., 172 So. 2d 116 (La. App. 1965) ; Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. South La.
Elec. Coop., 169 So. 2d 181 (La. App. 1964).
103 Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Charpentier, 165 So. 2d 614, 617 (La. App. 1964).
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viously contemplated. This loose combination of regulation, selfregulation, and competition is sometimes referred to as "regulated
competition."
Cooperatives in both Colorado and Louisiana are exempt from
the state income tax, though in Louisiana they pay an annual tax of
ten dollars per one hundred members served. 114 Since cooperatives
are technically without earnings, they are not subject to federal income tax, and seem to be specifically exempted under Section 502 (c)
(12) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. In neither Colorado
nor Louisiana are the cooperatives limited to operation in rural
5
areas.

10

A. Rural Electrification Administration v. Central Louisiana Electric
Co.106

The dispute between the cooperatives and the power companies
in Louisiana arose out of competition for new customers. Since the
Louisiana courts struck down earlier cooperative attempts at territorial protection," the cooperatives have sought to maintain their
"territorial integrity" by other means. The state's thirteen co-ops
banded together to form a super-cooperative 0 8 and threatened to
generate their own power by obtaining a loan from the REA - thus
putting the power companies out of the wholesale power business
and inflicting multi-million dollar losses - if the power companies
would not respect their "territorial integrity."" 9 The power companies insisted that a territorial protection agreement would violate
state public utility laws and the state and federal antitrust laws."1
Despite state and federal decisions favoring the power companies' position, the Administrator supported the cooperatives and
indicated that the loan would be approved. A furor over the granting of the loan took place in the Congress, the courts, and the Commission, with the power companies hotly contesting the Administrator's authority to make the loan."'
104
0

COLO.REv. STAT. § 138-1-8 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 12:325 (1950).
; LA. REV. STAr. ANN. § 12:301 (1950).

1 5 COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-19-1 (1963)

10 354 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1966).

See text accompanying note 102 supra.
108 One of the thirteen has since quit the super-cooperative and accepted the company
wholesale power offer.
109 Findings 4 through 8 of the District Court (W.D. La.) in granting its preliminary
injunction, Appendix to the Opinion in Rural Electrification Administration v. Central La. Elec. Co., 354 F.2d 859, 867 (5th Cir. 1966).
"o Id. at 862-63.
Ibid. The utilities and the NRECA have both presented their cases on the Louisiana
I1
dispute, annually, for the past few years to both l-iouse and Senatc Appropriations
Committees. A rather complete presentation by both the companies and the cooperatives is contained in Hearings on Agricultural Appropriations for 1965 before the
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
283-464 (1964).
107
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Details of loan applications justifying the need for proposed facilities are secret, but the plaintiff, Central Louisiana Electric Co.
(CLECO), suing in federal district court for a preliminary injunction, made a prima facie showing that the proposed G&T facility
would result in higher cost electricity for the cooperatives and their
consumers than that offered by the power companies."' In addition,
CLECO alleged that writing off 5,600,000 dollars worth of duplicated generating and transmitting capacity would result in higher
rates for its own customers."' Moreover, CLECO urged that the
service to the cooperatives by the new G&T facility would be less
reliable than the presently available service, due to a lack of interconnections with other power grids." 4
Previous disputes over similar G&T loans had resulted in instructions from the House and Senate Appropriations Committees
on the procedure to be followed in making G&T loans."' These instructions, embodied in REA Bulletin 111-3, declared that the Administrator would not grant any G&T loan until completion of a
power survey showing that the loan was,
(c) needed because existing and proposed contracts to provide the
facilities or service to be financed were found to be unreasonable,
each supplier was so advised, REA attempted to have such contracts
made reasonable, and the existing or other proposed supplier had
failed or refused to do so within the time set by the Administrator. 116

Exhaustive inquiries made by the Louisiana power companies clearly
determined that, according to the Administrator, the sole feature of
the power supply which made it unreasonable and justified the G&T
loan to replace it was the lack of a guarantee of "territorial integrity"
to the cooperatives. Since territorial agreements are illegal under
Louisiana law and probably legal under the federal antitrust laws
only if approved by the state regulatory commission," 7 the only way
in which the power companies could make their contracts reasonable
was to change Louisiana law to allow exclusive franchises, for cooperatives at least, and to subject the cooperatives to Commission
jurisdiction for the approval of territorial agreements. Even if it
could be assumed that the power companies have the ability to make
state law, it seems doubtful that the Rural Electrification Act authorizes the use of G&T loans for that purpose. On the contrary, it would
seem that the G&T loan power was meant to be subordinate to state
112 Central La. Elec. Co. v. Rural Electrification Administration, 236 F. Supp. 271, 274

(W.D. La. 1964).
113 Id. at 279.
114 Id. at 275.
115 Rural Electrification Administration v. Central La. Elec. Co., 354 F.2d 859, 866-67
(5th Cir. 1966).
116 29 Fed. Reg. 2765-66 (1964).
117

See note 80 supra.
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law. A proviso to Section 4, under which G&T loans are made,
states that "no loan for the construction, operation, or enlargement
of any generating plant shall be made unless the consent of the State8
authority having jurisdiction in the premises is first obtained.""
While the cooperatives are exempt from Commission jurisdiction in
Louisiana, the courts, which might be said to have "jurisdiction in
the premises," have explicitly rejected exclusive territories." 9 But
even if the Louisiana courts do not have "jurisdiction in the premises"
within the statute's meaning, it is a fair inference, consistent with
basic ideas of federalism, that Congress did not delegate to the Rural
Electrification Administrator the power to change state law by a
means as awkward, indirect, and in this instance, wasteful as the
G&T loan. More explicit wording and more intelligible standards
would seem required to authorize the exercise of such a power.
The federal district court issued a preliminary injunction restraining the Administrator from making the loan.' The Court of
Appeals, however, dissolved the injunction, but partially stayed its
dissolution pending appeal to the Supreme Court.'2' The Court of
Appeals based its decision on the fact that the Rural Electrification
Act contains no provision for judicial review, and, that being so, no
right of review is granted independently by Section 10(a) of the
Administrative Procedure Act." m The court found that the companies' only interest was in preventing "mere economic competition
made possible by governmental action"' 23 and this was insufficient to
give the power companies standing to sue.' 2"
A last effort by the power companies failed when the Public
Service Commission determined that a Louisiana statute requiring a
showing of inadequacy of present service or unreasonable rates for
such service before allowing another utility to replace the existing
one12 applies only to duplication of service to ultimate consumers,
and not to wholesale sales. 26
as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 904
(1964).
119 See cases collected note 102 supra and Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Charpentier, 165 So. 2d 614, 617 (La. 1964).
120 Central La. Elec. Co. v. Rural Electrification Administration, 236 F. Supp. 271
(W.D. La. 1964).
121 Rural Electrification Administration v. Central La. Elec. Co. 354 F.2d 859 (5th
Cir. 1966).
12 Id. at 863, 865. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(a), 60 Stat. 243 (1946), as
amended, 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1964).
123 Id. at 864.
124 Id. at 866.
125 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:123 (1950).
126 Central La. Elec. Co. v. Louisiana Elec. Coop. (La. P.S.C. 1965), quoted in U.S.
DEP'T. OF AGRICULTURE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF TERRITORIAL PROTECTION FOR REA118 Rural Electrification Act § 4, 49 Stat. 1365 (1936),

FINANCED COOPERATIVES, 14 (1965).
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As a result of the REA G&T loan under Louisiana's regime of
"regulated competition," power company consumers will likely pay
for the write-off of 5,600,000 dollars in duplicated generating and
transmitting facilities and cooperative consumers will be forced to
pay higher rates or their cooperative will accumulate less patronage
capital. It is hard to see what has been won. The fight over territory has, if anything, been exacerbated. Power companies, with excess generating power and transmission lines on their hands which
formerly supplied cooperative distribution systems, may be expected
to compete all the more vigorously with the cooperatives for new customers in the cooperatives' territories. Though the cooperatives will
acquire fifty-six million dollars in new capital, their cost of power
will be greater, and without rate increases, their margins will decline. Overall, the cooperatives will have weakened their competitive and financial position and probably lengthened the period of
their dependence on government support. Such foreseeably paradoxical results from making good on a threat to make a G&T loan
if "territorial integrity" is not secured should perhaps lead to the
conclusion that such use of the G&T loan power is not authorized
to begin with; for the probable results of actually making the loan
surely bear no relation to any statutory purpose of the Rural Electrification Act, whatever may be the hoped-for efficacy of the threat
of the loan.
B. Western Colorado Power Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n and
Colorado-UteElec. Ass'n. 27
While generating and transmitting facilities may be duplicated
under Louisiana's "regulated competition," the practice is strictly
prohibited under the theory of "regulated monopoly" in Colorado.
In order to begin a new facility in Colorado, the P.U.C. must be
shown that existing facilities are or will be inadequate." 8 Since 1961,
when the cooperatives were brought under the P.U.C.'s jurisdiction,129
"territorial integrity" has not been a problem for Colorado's cooperatives. Like the state's other certified, regulated monopolies, the
cooperatives have something akin to an exclusive franchise in the
areas they presently serve as long as they maintain adequate service.
Acting under statutory authority to eliminate duplication of service, 3 '
the Commission has settled company-cooperative disputes by (1)
assigning exclusive service areas, (2) defining non-exclusive areas in
which Commission approval was required for any extension, and (3)
2

P.2d 785 (Colo. 1966).
128Western Colo. Power Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 411 P.2d 785, 791 (Colo. 1966).
2
9 COLO. REV. STAT. § 115-1-3(2) (1963) was added in 1961.
1 7411

0

13 COLO. REV. STAT. §

115-5-1(2)

(1963).
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ordering sale of the facilities of one supplier in an area which the
Commission considers generally served by another supplier.' Thus,
"territorial integrity" and the right to grow to meet the needs of cooperative service areas have been firmly secured under the doctrine
of "regulated monopoly."
Nonetheless, the Administrator has recently announced that the
future of rural electrification in Colorado has been placed in "critical
jeopardy"'' 3 by the very theory of regulation which makes "territorial
integrity" possible. The Colorado Supreme Court has disallowed the
grant of a certificate of public convenience and necessity for construction of duplicate generating capacity in a decision.. which, the
Administrator said, "was the most stringent and drastic application
of the regulated monopoly doctrine that has hit the rural electrification program in its 30-year history."'3 4
The case which gave rise to these grave intonations was Western
Colorado Power Co. v. Public Utility Comm'n and Colorado-Ute
Elec. Ass'nY 5 Colorado-Ute had been a G&T cooperative with five
member distribution cooperatives for whom it produced power. Its
facilities had been obtained with a previous REA loan. Six other
existing distribution cooperatives, an Arizona irrigation agency, and
another G&T cooperative, later joined Colorado-Ute, which had applied for another REA G&T loan, and, having come under P.U.C.
jurisdiction since its first loan, sought a certificate of public convenience and necessity for a new thirty-one million dollar generating
plant at Hayden, Colorado. The P.U.C. granted the certificate for
the new plant, 6 largely on the theory that the cooperatives could
buy their power from any source they chose, despite the resulting
duplication. Due to exemption from federal and state income taxes
and a statutory preference in buying inexpensive power from a nearby federal project, Colorado-Ute could buy and produce power for
its eight new members for less than the present suppliers could afford to sell it to them. 7 There was no finding that the price of
power charged by the existing suppliers of the eight new members
was in any way unreasonable or that the service of the suppliers was
inadequate or undependable. 8 The Commission did find that there
131 U.S. DEP'T. OF AGRICULTURE, op.

cit. supra note 126, at 16, 44.

332 N.Y. Times, March 24, 1966, p. 30, col. 2 (city ed.).
133 Western Colo. Power Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 411 P.2d 785 (Colo. 1966).
134

N.Y. Times, supra note 132.

135411
13

P.2d 785 (Colo. 1966).

6 Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n, 48 P.U.R.3d 113 (Colo. P.U.C. 1963).

1 37

Id. at 126.

138 REA BULL. 111-3, 29 Fed. Reg. 2765 (1964), requiring that the Administrator find

the existing power supply contract unreasonable before granting a G&T loan, was
not, of course, yet in existence.
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would be a market for all the new generating capacity and that the
plant would speed the development of an adjoining federal river
storage project.'39
Pending appeal from the district court's approval of the Commission's decision, the Administrator made the loan. Construction
of the Hayden plant was completed seven months before the Colorado Supreme Court decided the case. In a six to one decision, the
court reversed the district court and the Commission.'
The court
found that Colorado-Ute sought to provide service to an area it had
not previously served and which was being adequately supplied by
other sources.' Service from the Hayden plant, the court said, would
only be substituted for that already being rendered.' 42 Permitting
the construction of these facilities was in direct conflict with the doctrine of regulated monopoly, which "was designed to prevent duplication of facilities and competition between utilities, and to authorize
new utilities in a field only when existing ones are found to be inadequate."''
Although the validity of the Administrator's actions are immune from any form of state or federal judicial review,'44 the court
did note that when state litigation over construction was in progress,
the state consent requirements of Section 4 of the Rural Electrification Act had not been met.' Section 4 also requires the Administrator to certify the adequacy of loan security and the likelihood of
timely repayment.'" The court commented that no reasonable person
could "believe that security for the proposed loan is adequate and
that the loan will be repaid in due course when the very right to construct the plant is still in litigation.' '"c'
The Colorado-Utedecision does not establish, as the Administrator has said it does, that "the rural electric cooperatives serve only
at the sufferance of the commercial companies.' 4 Indeed, some of
the existing sources of supply which the court found it illegal to duplicate without a finding of inadequacy were cooperative generating
and transmitting facilities,'49 not those of commercial companies.
139 Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n, 48 P.U.R.3d 113, 127-29 (Colo. P.U.C. 1963).
140Western Colo. Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 411 P.2d 785 (Colo. 1966).
141Id. at 789.
142 Ibid.

1I d. at 791.
144See text accompanying note 122 supra.
'5Rural Electrification Act § 4, 49 Stat. 1365 (1936), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 904
(1964). Western Colo. Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 411 P.2d 785, 798
(Colo. 1966).
'"Rural Electrification Act § 4, 49 Stat. 1365 (1936), as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 904
(1964).
147
Western Colo. Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 411 P.2d 785, 798 (Colo. 1966).
148
N.Y. Times, March 24, 1966, p. 30, col. 2 (city ed.).
149
Western Colo. Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 411 P.2d 785, 789 (Colo. 1966).
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The decision does, however, establish implicitly that cooperative generating and transmitting facilities will not be allowed to displace
existing sources of supply solely on the basis of cost advantages derived from government assistance and tax-free status. The court repeatedly emphasized that Colorado-Ute was not seeking to extend its
facilities to serve its existing service area - which surely would have
been allowed - but rather was seeking "to expand its service from a
small area in southwestern Colorado to cover substantially all [the]
Western Slope as well as many thousands of square miles in the
southeastern portion of the state."'""
The fact that cooperative G&T facilities can produce electricity
more cheaply than power company facilities, due to government assistance and tax-free status, would not seem to be a sound basis for
holding that the public convenience and necessity require they replace utilities whose cost of power is higher only because they do not
have those governmentally-granted advantages. Those advantages
were, in part, originally accorded to make rural electrification possible, not to enable one form of utility operation to displace another.
The court, while not treating the factors of government assistance or
tax status, seems to hold that those factors do not demonstrate the
inadequacy of existing facilities, for it was clear from the Commission's opinion that those factors alone produced the cooperative's
cost advantage'' - an important factor in granting the certificate of
public convenience and necessity.
The opinion in Colorado-Ute may be criticized for narrowly
equating its "absolute requirement that the Commission find inadequacy of service before granting a new certificate"'' with the public
convenience and necessity which the statute requires. There may be
instances in which the reasonable cost of adequate power under commercial conditions would be too high to permit its distribution even
under the cooperative form of operation. In such a case the interest
of consumers in receiving electricity may outweigh the regulated
monopoly's interest in not having its generating capacity duplicated.
However, such a factual situation was not before the court and hopefully an exception to its "absolute" rule could be made if it arises.
Also the fact that the construction of the Hayden plant may have
made possible accelerated river basin development in conjunction
with a federal project should have been a weighty consideration to
temper an absolute rule.
With respect to the end result achieved, however, Colorado's
'
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system of "regulated monopoly" seems preferable to Louisiana's
system of "regulated competition" and self-regulation. The Colorado P.U.C. and courts are open to hear, weigh, and resolve the
merits of constructing G&T and other facilities for the broad "public
convenience and necessity." Colorado consumers, from power companies or cooperatives, do not have to bear the cost of duplicate facilities, and Colorado power companies and cooperatives can better
plan their future facilities with the assurance that they will not be
displaced if adequately maintained and developed, thus significantly
reducing the risk, and probably the cost of utility investment.
CONCLUSION

As conceived in 1936, the task of the Rural Electrification Administration was to finance the extension of electricity to those in
rural areas who did not have it. To accomplish that task, loans were
made available, first at the same rate of interest which the government paid for its long-term funds and later at a fixed statutory rate
of two per cent, for everything from generation to consumption.
The REA has adopted the broad objectives of "parity" of urban
and rural electric rates and "equal opportunity" for rural people.
Its only means of accomplishing those objectives are the rural electric cooperatives which the REA brought into being and continues
to finance. The cooperatives are often in direct competition with
investor-owned utilities particularly in areas where the cities are
spreading into previously rural regions which the cooperatives serve.
In that conflict the Rural Electrification Administrator has sided
with the cooperatives and used the G&T loan to defend their "security and effectiveness."
The G&T loans made on the new "security and effectiveness"
ground are generally justified in terms of the cooperatives' need to
maintain their "territorial integrity" and include in it the expanding
city with its more profitable loads if they are to survive and grow to
meet the needs of the areas they serve without additional government
assistance. The need for exclusive territories is based upon a projected need for increased margins, which are, in turn, necessary to
obtain private financing. Private financing will be necessary, it is
said, because of the increasing capital needs of cooperative territories,
over and above what Congress will supply. But much of the capital
"need" over and above what Congress will supply will be caused by
inclusion of the expanding cities in the territories the cooperatives
claim. To the extent that the need for "territorial integrity" and inclusion of the expanding city are based on the capital needs of the
expanding city, the argument assumes its conclusion.
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The experience and present financial condition of the cooperatives indicate that there is little reason to fear for their "security and
effectiveness." Their growth rate in sales of electricity and in revenues has exceeded that of investor-owned utilities in recent years
and, as a group, their net worth, which presently exceeds one billion
dollars, has been growing by about ninety million dollars a year.
Congress has been willing to supply all of the capital needs of the
cooperatives to date. Thus survival seems certain. The need for
more capital than Congress will provide is in part a product of the
cooperatives' and the REA's own assumptions and G&T loan policy.
Much of the need might disappear if the cooperatives were to give
up their claim to urban areas growing into their territories. Private
financing will probably not be available to meet this projected capital need even if "territorial integrity" were secured. In view of these
considerations the justification for the REA's use of the G&T loan
to protect "territorial integrity" is indeed open to serious doubt.
And, apart from the Administrator's justifications, the use of G&T
loans to secure territorial protection bears no discernible relation to
a statutory purpose of furnishing electricity to "those in rural areas
who are not receiving central station service."
In addition, the G&T loan is an administrative tool ill-suited
for the task of protecting a cooperative's territory. While the threat
of its use to deprive a power company of its wholesale power sales
to cooperatives may have some force, actually making the loan would
only seem to aggravate the territorial conflict. Furthermore, territorial protection may be illegal under state and federal antitrust law.
Making G&T loans because a power company refuses to enter an illegal agreement is a clear abuse of the Administrator's power. Yet,
since the Administrator is not subject to state or federal judicial review, his actions may not be questioned in court, no matter how evidently illegal or harmful the result.
The rural electric cooperatives may, however, be subjected to
state regulation. Particularly in the case of G&T loans, where the
consent of the state authority having jurisdiction in the premises is
required before a loan can be made, the Rural Electrification Act
seems to have contemplated that the states would regulate and control the construction of facilities. Those states which have exempted
the cooperatives from regulation on the ground that they are selfregulating seem to have done so on the theory that consumer-owned,
non-profit organizations could not exploit their consumer-members.
That may be true. But the impact of cooperative operations on the
state's regulated electric utilities and their consumers was not, it
seems, anticipated. A cooperative's interest and that of its consumers
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may, indeed, conflict with the public interest, as it seems to have in
the Colorado-Ute case. The many states which have not extended
public utility commission jurisdiction to resolve the conflicts which
have arisen under the inadequate theory of self-regulation share at
least equal responsibility with the REA for the waste, duplication,
and often higher rates which consumers of both cooperatives and
power companies must bear as the result of REA G&T loans.
The most appropriate resolution of the multiple problems which
are involved in REA G&T loan policy would seem to be the extension of state regulation over the cooperatives. A highly complex
economic decision is required to determine whether a particular G&T
facility is needed and which concern should build it. The adequacy
and dependability of existing sources of supply, the geographical
configuration and proximity of existing transmission and distribution lines, the location of offices, service facilities and personnel,
outstanding franchises, the financial health of the concern, resulting
duplication, serving the entire area, and a host of other considerations
should be weighed in making that decision. Many of these same
considerations would be relevant in determining whether company
or cooperative should serve the new customers in a particular area.
Certainly far more is relevant than which concern strung the first
line in an area. Hearings at which affected parties may be heard
would also be helpful in determining what is truly in the interest of
the public as a whole. The Administrator does not have this information available to him in making his decision and has no procedure
for obtaining it, as the state regulatory commissions generally do.
In an industry where competition and duplicated facilities are enormously wasteful, the rational allocation of the resources of the utility
industry, including the cooperatives, under commission stewardship,
such as that which exists in Colorado, would seem far preferable to
the unresolved chaos which prevails on the Louisiana countryside.
A valuable by-product of extending commission jurisdiction would
be the prevention of the harmful effects of a generation and transmission loan policy gone awry.

